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THE ENGLISH INVASION OF SPANISH
FLORIDA, 1700-1706
by CHARLES  W. ARNADE
THOUGH FLORIDA had been discovered by Ponce de Leon in1513, not until 1565 did it become a Spanish province
in fact. In that year Pedro Menendez de Aviles was able to
establish a permanent capital which he called St. Augustine.
Menendez and successive executives had plans to make St.
Augustine a thriving metropolis ruling over a vast Spanish
colony that might possibly be elevated to a viceroyalty. Nothing
of this sort happened. By 1599 Florida was in desperate straits:
Indians had rebelled and butchered the Franciscan missionaries,
fire and flood had made life in St. Augustine miserable, English
pirates of such fame as Drake had ransacked the town, local
jealousies made life unpleasant. Spain threatened to dismantle
St. Augustine. The viceroyal dreams were rapidly vanishing and
to maintain the status quo was now the greatest ambition in
order to preserve the very existence of Spanish Florida. 1
Exactly one hundred years later things had improved little
or none, according to our mid-twentieth-century notion of pro-
gress, but when judged in accordance with Spanish Florida stand-
ards the “provincias de las Floridas” were far better off in 1699
than in 1599. AS a matter of fact, St. Augustine, its environs,
and the other regions under actual Spanish occupation, were
in the midst of a “golden age” never equalled before and hardly
ever achieved again under the Spanish flag. 2
The Franciscans had revitalized their sixteenth-century mis-
sions and bravely marched west into populous Apalache. Here
and along the trail to Apalache they founded many missions,
1.  The  s tory  of  F lor ida  a t  the  end  of  the  s ix teen th  cen tury  and  the
efforts to dismantle St. Augustine is told by Charles W. Arnade,
Florida on Trial  (Coral Gables, 1959).
2 .  The  emergence  of  the  golden  age  and  i t s  re la t ion  to  the  c reo le  
landed  a r i s tocracy  tha t  was  coming  in to  be ing  most ly  made  up
from St .  August ine  c i t izens ,  i s  ske tched by  Char les  W.  Arnade ,
“Cattle Raising in Spanish Florida, 1513-1763,” to be published
in the Joumal of  Agricultural  History.
[ 29 ]
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thriving by mid-century. 3 Under the government of the ener-
getic but unethical Pablo de Hita y Salazar (1675-1680), set-
tlers were sent into Apalache. 4 When Hita y Salazar arrived in
St. Augustine, the stone fortress, a dream of every governor
since Pedro Menendez de Aviles, was in full construction. With
the near completion of this fort St. Augustine changed from a
miserable village to a respectable city. 5 The acid Father Alonso
de Leturiondo, a true St. Augustinian and parish priest at the
end of the century, tells us that it was “a magnificent fort of
modern construction of such great capacity that it can, on oc-
casions, shelter within its walls all the people of the city.” Letu-
riondo told the King that this fort was “beautiful, it is a very
pleasing sight to the eye. Its entire structure is haughty and
powerful.” The very presence of this fort had changed the style
of living of St. Augustine and this in turn of all of occupied
Spanish Florida. 6
Since 1650, a proud citizenry of Florida creoles had come
into being. Many of them were army personnel stationed in
the fort. It had been the desire of the Spanish Crown since the
foundation of St. Augustine to man the Florida fortifications with
about 350 men, mostly from Spain. 7 As time went on a custom
developed to enroll the native sons in the St. Augustine garrison.
By mid-century a proud criollo military tradition tied to St.
Augustine had developed. The leading families supplied men
and officers to the garrison. The Crown fought a rear action
to avoid this and in 1692 even issued a royal cedula “that
native-born criollos are not to hold more than forty plazas of
the garrison.” 8 This was never possible to enforce. Only the
3.  For  a  shor t  summary  of  the  emergence  of  the  Apalache  miss ions
see Herbert E. Bolton, Arredondo’s Historical Proof of Spain’s Title
to Georgia (Berkeley, 1925). 
4. Hirachuba and Andres, caciques of Apalache, to the Governor of
Florida, San Luis [in Apalache, Florida] February 12, 1699, 4 folios,
Stetson Collection, University of Florida, AGI: 54-5-19-38.
5. See Albert Manucy, The Building of  the Casti l lo de San Marcos
(Washington, 1942).  
6. Memoria del Bachiller Alonso de Leturiondo [written in Spain about
1700 and handprinted in St.  Augustine], Stetson, AGI: 58-2-3-14,
31 pp.       
7. Cf. Luis Arana “Infantry in Spanish Florida, 1671-1679,” seminar
paper University of Florida, 1958. Available in the library of the
Castillo de San Marcos, St. Augustine.
8 .  Roya l  Cedu la ,  Madr id ,  Feb .  18 ,  1693 ,  4  fo l ios ,  S te t son ,  AGI :
58-1-22-26.
2
Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 41 [1962], No. 1, Art. 7
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol41/iss1/7
THE  ENGLISH  INVASION  OF  SPANISH  FLORIDA 31
governorship remained beyond the reach of the local families
with vested interests. 9 These families such as the Hitas, Horruy-
tiners, Mexias, Solanas, Ponce de Leons (not descendents of
the famous conquistador), Primo de Riberas, and many others
had grown respectable but very narrow-minded during this last
century. 10  The emergence of the beautiful and powerful fort
had finally given them a raison d’etre.
Why did this fort exist? Certainly not to justify a local mili-
tary citizenry. It was built because of the ever-increasing inter-
national challenge to Spain’s vital shipping route which skirted
along the Florida coast. This danger had existed as far back as
the sixteenth century; it was, after all, the main reason that
Spain kept Florida. 11  In 1668 the English freebooter, Robert
Searles, with or without tacit approval from his Sovereign, at-
tacked St. Augustine on May 29, causing much damage and
confusion. 12 Only two years later English colonists in a most
daring move established Carolina with Charles Town as its main
settlement. It was the beginning of a long age of conflict be-
tween Spain and England, bringing war to Spanish Florida and
sharp diplomatic hassles in European capitals. The great Herbert
Bolton called it the fight over the “debatable land.” 13
The various skirmishes that began with the founding of
Carolina culminated in the full-fledged invasion of Florida in
1702. The Carolinians from the very beginning felt an intense
hatred for Catholic Spain. Coupled with this was a feeling of
superiority; they regarded the Spaniards of Florida with utter
disdain. They were sure of an easy final victory as soon as they
had consolidated their new province. But by 1700 France had
9.  See  John  TePaske ,  “The  Governorsh ip  of  Spanish  F lor ida ,  1700-
1763,” Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1959.
10 .  In te res t ing  i s  the  le t te r  of  Governor  Diego  de  Qui roga  y  Losada
to  the  Crown,  Apr i l  1 ,  1688 ,  in  which  he  compla ined  in  no  un-
certain terms about the unbeatable nepotism of the Florida garrison
which made h is  execut ive  dut ies  ext remely  d i f f icul t  (4  fo l ios ,
Stetson, AGI: 54-5-12-53).
11. “Informacion de  orden de  S .  M.  sobre  e l  es tado genera l  de  las
provincias de la Florida y si conviene o no desmantelar el fuerte de
San Agustin,” St. Augustine, 1602 ,  170  fo l ios ,  S te t son ,  AGI :  86-
5-24.    
12. Royal Officials of Florida to the Crown, St. Augustine, June 30,
1668, 10 folios, AGI: 58-5-14-134, North Carolina Spanish Records,
reel 3; Royal Officials to the Crown, St. Augustine, 1671, 38 folios,
Stetson, AGI: Escribania de Camera, legajo 155, no. 22.
13 .  Bo l ton ,  1 .
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completed sovereignty over the Mississippi with the establishment
of Louisiana. While to the south of Protestant Carolina lay
Catholic Spanish Florida completely determined to oppose English
expansion, to the west emerged an even stronger line of resistance
manned by Catholic France. And while the Carolinians underesti-
mated the Spaniards in their disdainfulness they feared the
French. Some thoughtful minds in Charles Town pondered over
the possibility of a French-Spanish alliance which would en-
circle Carolina. 14 Then in 1700 the King of Spain died child-
less and Louis XIV claimed the throne for his Bourbon grandson.
If there was consternation in Europe over the union of France
and Spain there was near panic in Carolina.
Even before the news of the War of the Spanish Succession
reached America, Carolina was ready to march on Spanish
Florida. Substantial rumors had reached Charles Town that
the French were ready to attack and use Spanish St. Augustine
as a main base. The Carolinians elevated the ruthless James
Moore to the governorship of Carolina. This man, “active,
ambitious and aggressive,” was an “impecunious planter,” a
high church man and a heartless slave dealer. There was in him
one-half honest dedication to the cause of Carolina and Pro-
testantism and another half to personal advancement by what-
ever means; in short, a saint and a devil. He was shrewd but
reckless. 15 As a fire-eater of the worst type he convinced the
colonial legislature to organize an expeditionary force to advance
on St. Augustine.1 6 Disdainful as ever of the Spaniards, Moore
was careless in his preparation and failed to obtain proper in-
telligence about the military strength of St. Augustine. He mis-
judged the great fort at St. Augustine, a true powerhouse. Moore’s
counterpart, the Spanish governor of Florida, had arrived in
St. Augustine in 1700 but immediately understood the true
value of the fort. Governor Joseph de Zuniga y Zerda made a
fast survey of his garrison and came to the conclusion that an
open battle was dangerous; he decided to retreat inside the great
14. Verner W. Crane, “The Southern Frontier in Queen Anne’s War,”
American Historical  Review, XXIV (1918-1919),  379-395.    
15. David Duncan Wallace, The History of South Carolina (New York,
1934), I, 157; Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732
(Ann  Arbor ,  1929) ,  40 .
16. A. S. Salley, ed.,  Journals  of  the Common House of  Assembly of
South Carolina for 1702 (Columbia, S.C., 1932), 107 pp., passim.
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fort with all the inhabitants of St. Augustine and surrounding
areas. 17
Moore and his men lashed into coastal Florida and Georgia
in November, 1702, destroying Spanish outposts on Amelia
Island and along the waterways of the mouth of the St. Johns
River. 18  Whenever they conquered such posts, which usually
had a church with a Franciscan friar as the spiritual protector,
the English leveled the settlement by fire. Such procedure first
adopted in November, 1702, was continued through the whole
war until 1706. This shows the English aim of destruction
rather than actual occupation or conquest.
By mid-November Moore and his soldiers and sailors had
captured the city of St. Augustine without a battle and were
laying siege to the fort. He admitted that he had been unaware
of the size and power of the fort and that he had failed to bring
the right weapons to capture this castle. He dispatched an
aide to get more powerful artillery from Jamaica. A long siege
ensued which has recently been described in great detail. 19  It
suffices to say that Moore failed to capture the fort and Spanish
reinforcements from Havana arrived before the anticipated Eng-
lish help from Jamaica. Moore hastily retreated after completely
burning the town. Moore’s retreat was orderly and not a rout. 20
Zuniga wanted to pursue the enemy but his men, besieged for
two months, were exhausted and the relief contingent refused
to obey further instructions of Zuniga once their mission had
been accomplished.  
The Spanish had won a Pyrrhic victory and Moore was
thoroughly discredited. He lost his governorship but not his in-
fluence with the emotional legislature and soon regained it with
the new executive. Moore was given permission to have a second
17 .  Governor  Zun iga  to  the  Crown,  S t .  Augus t ine ,  March  15 ,  1702 ,
with enclosures, AGI:
reel 9.
58-1-27, North Carolina Spanish Records,
18. See Charles W. Arnade, “Piribiriba on the Salamototo. A Spanish
Fort on the St. Johns River,” Papers (The Jacksonville Historical
Soc ie ty ) ,  IV  (1960) ,  67 -84 .
19. Charles W. Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702 (Gainesville,
1959). 
20. John Oldmixon, From the History of the British Empire in America,
1708 in A. S. Salley, Jr., ed., Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650-
1708 (New York, 1911), 317-373.     
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try but without governmental financial support. 21 Naturally he
was most anxious for vindication. And the Carolina government
was also desirous to try again, because they hated Spain emotion-
ally and feared French might. Louisiana was becoming every
day stronger and better established, and between mighty French
Louisiana and the powerful Spanish fort at St. Augustine lay
the fertile and fairly densely populated lands of Apalache, spotted
with small Spanish missions attached to weak guard houses. San
Luis of Apalache, today’s Tallahassee, was the administrative
center of Apalache. No powerful fort protected the region. In-
dians were more abundant than in any other part of Florida
and were of a higher civilization; they were of uncertain loyalty
to Spain. A fairly good trail connected San Luis with St. Augus-
tine through some cattle country along today’s Gainesville area. 22
Communications with Spanish Pensacola just due east of French
Louisiana were semi-adequate. 23
Moore realized that a march into Apalache was to everyone’s
advantage and was foolproof. First, there was no fort to conquer;
second, the Spanish military garrison was weak and ineffectual;
third, direct communication between the French and the Spanish
colonies would be interrupted; fourth, intertribal warfare between
English-dominated Indians and those of Apalache could be
started; fifth, the Apalache Indians could be easily weaned from
Spanish rule: sixth, many missions, hated symbols of Catholi-
cism, could be destroyed to provide a victory for Protestantism
and emotionalism; seventh, the Apalache Indians could provide a
new market for the Carolina traders; eight, valuable cattle ranches
would provide a good war bounty; ninth, the main Spanish road
system would fall into English hands; tenth, mighty St. Augustine
would be completely isolated; eleventh, Moore, always interested
21. A. S. Salley, ed.,  Journals  of  the Common House of  Assembly of
S o u t h  C a r o l i n a  f o r  1 7 0 3  (Co lumbia ,  S .C . ,  1934) ,  140  pp . ,  s ee
i n d e x .  
22 .  Crown Col lec t ion  of  Maps  of  Nor th  Amer ica ,  Ser ies  I I I ,  Publ ic
Records  Off ice  (London) ,  Colonia l  Off ice ,  700:  Nor th  Amer ican
Colonies, Florida, nos. 125 et  seq.  Cf. Mark F. Boyd, “The First
Amer ican  Road in  F lor ida ,”  Flor ida  H i s to r i ca l  Quar t e r l y ,  XIV
(October, 1935-January, 1936), 73-106, 139-192.        
23. “Demanda Pues ta  Por  Los  Senores  Juezes  Off ic ia les  de  la  Real
Haz ienda  .  .  .” [part of the residencia of Governor Zuniga]. St.
Augus t ine ,  1707 ,  fo l s .  12941-12936 ,  S te t son ,  AGI :  58-2 -8 .  Cf .
Mark F. Boyd, “A Map of the Road from Pensacola to St. Marks,
1778,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XVII (July, 1938), 15-23.
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in Indian slaves for his plantations, would be able to double or
triple his slave supply. The attack on Apalache was the only
logical plan of a renewed attack on Spanish Florida.
The Carolina legislature in September, 1703, approved per-
mission for Moore to support the friendly Indians and attack
Apalache with them, but refused to pay one cent for the expedi-
tion. 24 Moore was convinced that he would have financial gain
by plunder and slave hunting. He immediately gathered a relative-
ly small army of abundant Indians and about fifty whites which
reached Apalache in January, 1704. 25 From then until at least
1706 Moore and his band rampaged through Apalache, burning
buildings and committing atrocities of all sorts besides hunting
Indian slaves. The Moore trail of destruction through fertile
Spanish Apalache during the Queen Anne’s War is one of the
most difficult to reconstruct in its details.
Moore and his men apparently followed no rigorous military
procedure, as indeed few colonial armies in America did, and
therefore left no written records for the future. The Spaniards,
especially the executive command in St. Augustine, were unable
to ever find out exactly what was going on in Apalache, only
knowing that Moore was on the rampage. Often the situation
in Apalache during those crucial years as known in the governor’s
office in St. Augustine was more vague than what we know today.
Consequently the Spanish records leave much to desire in re-
constructing the Apalache campaign of the Carolinian Moore.
Dr. Mark Boyd several years ago gathered some data about
the campaign 26 and has made a chart of the various missions
in Apalache with their probable dates of destruction at the hands
of the Moore raiders. 27  Additional data from Spanish sources
is coming to light at a snail’s pace. For example, most printed
sources state that the largest military engagement of the Moore
campaign occurred at the beginning of the campaign on January
25, 1704, when he attacked the village of Ayubale. Yet, recently
found documents speak of another large engagement on September
24. Salley, Journals ,  1703,  see index: Moore.
25. Crane, Southern Frontier ,  79-80, 21n.
26 .  Mark  F .  Boyd ,  Ha le  G.  Smi th ,  and  John  W.  Gr i f f in ,  Here  They
Once Stood (Gainesville, 1951); Mark F. Boyd, ed., “Document:
Further Considerations of the Apalachee Mission,” The Americas,
IX (1935),  459-479.  
27. Boyd, et .  al . ,  Here They Once Stood,  11-13.
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3, 1705, at an unmentioned location, possibly in the Gainesville
area. In this skirmish the Spaniards were decimated and lost
some of the most trustworthy officers of the St. Augustine garri-
son, all respected citizens of St. Augustine. 28 Anyhow, enough
primary material has been unearthed to state that by August,
1706, the Carolinians had destroyed everything in Spanish
Florida from the Apalachicola to the St. Johns River. Only St.
Augustine and its immediate surroundings was still under effec-
tive Spanish tutelage. While not actually occupying north central
Florida, the English had successfully neutralized Spanish Florida.
It is pertinent to try to determine in a few lines the reason
for the Spanish semi-collapse in Florida under the impact of
the Moore invasions. As stated, Florida since its beginnings was
always in a precarious position. Beginning with 1680 a period of
strong citizenry and economic prosperity developed. But Moore
brought this golden age to an abrupt end. First of all, the
prosperity was based solely on military increments and did not
extend into the provinces, especially to the missions and natives.
It was localized in St. Augustine; more specifically it gyrated
around the fort. 29
While the Spaniards had strengthened their military material
they failed to improve the social and related conditions. Their
Indian policy, the basis of which was the mission, was utterly
rigid even in the face of English competition. The English
offered the Indians all kinds of goods, including firearms and
liquor, while the Spaniards promised them eternal life in heaven.
They treated them with a stern paternalism.
The results of this whole Spanish policy of increasing mili-
28. Junta de Guerra [of the Council of Indies] to the Crown, Madrid,
May 9, 1709, 4 folios, Stetson, AGI: 58-1-23-397; Consejo de Indias
to the Crown, Madrid, June 6, 1709, with enclosures, 16 folios,
Stetson, AGI: 58-1-20-790. These two documents are requisitions
for permanent pensions for the widows of the victims of the battle
of  September  3 ,  1705.  The  widows were :  Josepha  Dominguez ,
widow of Juan Manuel; Anna Maria Lopez, widow of Juan de la
Guardia; Lorenza de Garcia, widow of Juan Domingues; Isabel de
Leon,  widow of  Luis  Entonado;  I sabe l  Lopez ,  widow of  Diego
Nunez; Maria Morales, widow of Bernardo Martin; Juliana Ponce,
widow of Joseph Gomez; Maria de la Concepcion, widow of Fran-
cisco Vasunto; Mariana Gutierrez, widow of Thomas de Santiago;
Maria de los Reyes, widow of Manuel Solana.
29. See the excellent study, based solely on primary records, by Luis
A r a n a ,  “The  Spanish  Infant ry :  the  Queen  of  Bat t les  in  F lor ida ,
1671-1702,” Master’s Thesis, University of Florida, 1960.
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tarism and paternalism when attacked by the English were
natural and obvious. Moore failed before the military power
of the fort but he was victorious when he attacked in the open
space where the missions stood. 30 Spain’s policy of relying in
Florida solely on a military organization, which included the
missions, proved to be the most important cause of English
success and Spanish failure.
30. Charles W. Arnade, “The Failure of Spanish Florida,” The Americas,
XVI (1960), 271-281.     
9
Arnade: The English Invasion of Spanish Florida, 1700-1706
Published by STARS, 1962
